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Social Inclusion in the Knowledge Economy  
Unions’ Strategies and Institutional Change in the Austrian and 
German Training Systems 
 
Abstract 
As skill formation systems are increasingly under pressure from de-industrialization and the rise of 
knowledge economies, their ability to include the low-skilled has been strained. But what determines 
how skill formation systems adjust to this challenge? By explaining the divergence of two most-
similar systems, those of Austria and Germany, the article highlights the key role of trade unions and 
of the institutional resources and legacies available to them. Where institutional resources are high 
and legacies positive, as in Austria, unions were crucial in setting an inclusive pathway of reform of 
the training system. Where, on the contrary, institutional resources are low and legacies negative, as 
in Germany, unions’ strategies for inclusion failed, paving the way to a dualizing outcome. The article 
therefore provides a novel analysis of institutional change in skill formation systems, while also 
offering broader insights on the relationship between coordinated and egalitarian capitalism in post-
industrial knowledge-based economies. 
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Collective skill formation systems have been at the center of significant analysis in comparative 
political economy (CPE) over the last three decades (Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer & Trampusch, 
2012; Culpepper, 2001; Dobbins & Busemeyer, 2014; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Martin, 2012; Martin 
& Knudsen, 2010; Thelen, 2004). One of the central features that caught scholars’ interest was the 
ability of these systems – in conjunction with industrial relations and labor market institutions – to 
combine economic efficiency, by providing firms with a broad base of specifically skilled workers, 
and social inclusion, by integrating academic low-achievers rather smoothly into the training system 
and subsequently the labor market (Iversen, 2005; Soskice, 1994). Yet, since the mid-1990s, 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) have become familiar with the concept of ‘crisis of the 
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apprenticeship market’, i.e. the inability for all qualified applicants to secure a training place 
(Busemeyer, 2012). Post-industrialization contributed to this phenomenon as the shrinking supply of 
apprenticeship places is tightly linked with the decline of industrial sectors. This process is further 
exacerbated by increasingly demanding qualifications for ever more complex training profiles that 
are associated with the rise of knowledge-based economies (Jacob & Solga, 2015). For the low skilled 
tend to be those most hit by these two trends, the relatively smooth integration of low-achieving youth 
in the labor market has been strained (Kupfer, 2010; Thelen, 2014). 
Solving the crisis of the apprenticeship market and reconciling the economic efficiency and 
social inclusion functions of vocational training systems has therefore become a key political problem 
for governments and social partners in CMEs since the late 1990s. Against this background, the 
divergent trajectories that we observe in the most-similar cases of Austria and Germany throw up the 
empirical puzzle that we seek to tackle. In particular, we ask why Austria established a publicly-
financed alternative to firm-based training, which provides unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers with 
the same certification as their peers in the dual system, while their German counterparts by and large 
end up in the transition system, which prolongs their school-to-work transition and does not lead to 
recognized certifications valued by the labor market. This difference is not trivial as distinct 
institutional logics underpin the two systems. In the Austrian case, access to high quality training is 
guaranteed to all young people by the state. In Germany, employers remain the gatekeepers to the 
apprenticeship system as they control the supply of training slots. The distributional implications are 
significant. When German employers decrease the number of training slots on offer (e.g. because of 
an economic downturn), unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers receive lower quality training with 
uncertain labor market returns; in the same situation, Austrian young people are guaranteed a training 
offer that leads them to the full vocational qualification recognized and esteemed in the labor market.  
Contrary to dominant explanations of institutional change in skill formation systems based 
primarily on employers’ preferences or cross-class coalitions, we contend that differences in unions’ 
strategies explain the divergent outcome between the two countries. Employers’ preferences in both 
countries were perfectly overlapping: they opposed the introduction of non-firm-based training 
leading to equal certification as the dual system, as they feared that the introduction of such forms of 
training would undermine the dual system. Governments’ preferences were by and large the same 
too. In both countries, governments led by the center-left were in office when the crisis of the 
apprenticeship market unfolded. The Austrian SPÖ and the German SPD manifested a keen concern 
towards the increasing number of young people that could not land an apprenticeship place as this 
would exacerbate social exclusion and youth unemployment. Both center-left parties openly 
expressed their willingness to upgrade non-firm based training and make its qualifications equivalent 
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to the dual system as a way to bridge the lack of apprenticeship place and still provide unsuccessful 
apprenticeship seekers with equal educational certifications. 
Unions in both countries also shared their first order preferences as they both campaigned for 
the right of all young people to high quality training. Furthermore, they also expressed a strong 
preference for maintaining their institutional involvement in training policy. However, we argue that 
the availability of different institutional resources and institutional legacies determined that the same 
first-order preference was translated into very different strategies – which were met by opposite 
political outcomes. In our analysis, therefore, we identify policy preferences along class cleavages in 
line with a power resources approach. However, departing from a pure power resources model, we 
argue that the key factor explaining the divergent outcome is not difference in sheer power between 
capital and labor in the two countries, but rather the institutional context allowing actors to pursue 
different strategic choices. Hence, we point to the key role of institutional resources and legacies – 
rather than power resources.  
The argument is not only of relevance to the politics of institutional change in vocational 
training systems. Given that skill formation has been traditionally one of the central institutional 
spheres allowing coordinated models of capitalism to deliver socially inclusive outcomes, the article 
provides also insights to disentangle a broader phenomenon that the literature has only recently started 
to tackle systematically, namely the relationship between coordinated and egalitarian capitalism in 
post-industrial advanced capitalist countries (cf. Ibsen & Thelen, 2017; Iversen & Soskice, 2015; 
Thelen, 2014; Vlandas, 2018). 
Our empirical investigation is based on case studies of the main reforms of the ‘periphery’ of 
the Austrian and German training systems, i.e. of those segments that absorb school-leavers who are 
unable to land a place in the ‘core’ apprenticeship system. Selecting Austria and Germany as case 
studies allows us to resort to a most-similar research design, in which the cases are most similar across 
‘background conditions’ but they differ in the outcome that we seek to explain (Seawright & Gerring, 
2008, p. 304). In particular, the two countries are commonly categorized as CMEs for their production 
regime (Hall & Soskice, 2001); as Christian-democratic for their welfare states (Ferragina & Seeleib-
Kaiser, 2011); and as collective skill formation systems as far as their training regimes are concerned 
(Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012). Methodologically, we follow Peter Hall’s notion of systematic 
process analysis (Hall, 2003). We lay out a set of alternative theories paying particular attention to 
both outcomes and underlying processes that we expect to observe according to each theoretical 
proposition. We then cast a wide net and collect empirical evidence that we weight against the 
predicted outcomes and processes associated with each theory. Empirical observations are drawn 
from a variety of data sources, covering policy documents, press releases, secondary literature and 
semi-structured interviewsi with representatives of the three crucial actors that populate the policy 
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field of interest, namely: governments, employers and trade unions. We set out, therefore, the ground 
for a three-cornered comparison between empirical observations and rival theories allowing us to 
make a judgment on the explanatory power of each theoretical proposition. The article proceeds as 
follows: we first outline existing theories of institutional change in skill formation systems and we 
advance an alternative argument centered on trade unions’ preferences and the institutional context 
within which they operate (section 2); we then move on to the country case studies (sections 3 and 
4); finally, section 5 provides a discussion of the findings and broader implications for the CPE 
literature. 
 
2. Between economic efficiency and social inclusion: theoretical pathways of change in 
vocational training systems 
Collective skill formation systems, most notably the dual apprenticeship system of German-speaking 
countries, have been central to a ‘coordinated’ model of capitalism able to reconcile economic 
efficiency with relatively egalitarian outcomes (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001; Finegold & 
Soskice, 1988; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 1994). It should be noted, however, that the analysis 
provided in the CPE literature refers for the most part to skill formation within manufacturing-
dominated political economies. This structural feature is crucial to understand why skill formation 
systems could simultaneously perform an ‘economic efficiency’ and a ‘social inclusion’ role. At times 
of industrial expansion, companies in the industrial sector were in the position to absorb a large 
number of school-leavers into their apprenticeship systems and pave the way to a smooth school-to-
work transition. In this context, variation in the academic abilities of school leavers was not a major 
issue, given that industrial production was not necessarily thriving on high social and cognitive skills, 
helping the integration of academically weak candidates into mid-skilled jobs.  
Yet, de-industrialization and the expansion of knowledge-based employment posed a threat 
to the simultaneous achievement of economic efficiency and social inclusion. From the late 1990s in 
particular, the problem of integrating unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers into the training market 
became pressing. To put some numbers on these developments in Germany, the annual number of 
new apprenticeships stayed around 600,000 in the 1990s but has decreased continuously since 2005 
to reach 480,674 in 2015; at the same time, the number of entrants into the transition system increased 
from about 280,000 in the 1990s to about 420,000 in 2005 (cf. Busemeyer, 2012). Even today, at 
times of economic expansion, around one third of secondary-school leavers is unable to directly land 
an apprenticeship place and enter instead the transition system (Destatis, 2015). The crucial point to 
note here is the following: the progressive shrinking of core industrial sectors, and the general 
upgrading of jobs (Oesch & Rodríguez Menés, 2010), contributed to a decoupling of the economic 
efficiency and social inclusion aims of skill formation. Indeed, historical analyses of participation in 
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the German training system found low-achieving youth to have ‘decreasing chances of entering and 
completing fully qualifying VET programs’ over time (Jacob & Solga, 2015) pointing to the 
integration of low-achieving youth in the training system as a structural problem. Thelen (2014, pp. 
92-97) points out in this respect that the German skill formation system offers apprenticeships of 
ever- higher quality to meet the requirements of jobs in high-tech sectors. Yet, as apprenticeship 
programs become more demanding to meet the requirements of the emergent knowledge economy, 
the likelihood of low-achieving pupils to land an apprenticeship has been decreasing. Thus, while the 
economic role of the vocational training system was successfully preserved, its social inclusion 
function was significantly weakened (Kupfer, 2010; Thelen, 2014). In this respect scholars noted a 
paradox by which high-quality coordinated training systems might in fact be more exclusionary than 
low-quality market-based systems in post-industrial knowledge-based societies (Martin & Knudsen, 
2010). Our cases, however, offer a more nuanced view on the paradox. While recent developments 
in the German system certainly suggest an exclusionary trajectory, we do not observe a similar 
exclusionary path in the equally coordinated and high-quality Austrian skill formation system. What 
explains such variation between most-similar countries?  
The role of employers, and of cleavages among them, has emerged as a particularly promising 
avenue to theorize institutional change in skill formation systems (cf. Culpepper, 2007; Martin, 1999; 
Thelen & Busemeyer, 2012; Trampusch, 2010). The main thrust of this stream of literature is that 
large and small employers make a different ‘use’ of vocational training and they, therefore, have 
different preferences vocational training policy. Large employers, less cost sensitive, are expected to 
push for more flexible training, to seek skill formation at higher levels and to demand more skill 
specificity at the firm-level. Small employers, conversely, are more sensitive to cost concerns and are 
expected to support a standardized training system, providing chiefly industry-specific skills, hence 
creating a broad pool of workers to draw from. Employer-centered explanations have been mostly 
used to theorize patterns of change in terms of the ‘economic function’ of training systems (e.g. 
focusing on duration of training, its modularization or level of skills). Yet, we might derive theoretical 
predictions regarding the ‘social inclusion’ component of training systems. In particular, the Austrian 
inclusionary path was built on the back of significant state intervention and it is plausible to expect 
Austrian employers, dominated by small and medium enterprises, to support state intervention as a 
way to shore up some of the financial burden of training, while allowing them to achieve the critical 
objective of resorting to a broad pool of skilled workers with certified qualifications (Culpepper, 
2007; Trampusch, 2010). On the other hand, it would be equally plausible to expect German 
employers, dominated by large firms, to oppose state intervention (Thelen & Busemeyer, 2012; 
Trampusch, 2010). This scenario is both theoretically plausible and consistent with the outcome that 
we observe in the two countries. However, as the case studies will illustrate in detail, this set of 
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hypothesized employer preferences is not corroborated by the data. Indeed, if an employer-centered 
explanation were true, we would observe different employer preferences driving the observed 
difference in outcome. Yet, Austrian and German employers displayed a strikingly similar set of 
preferences, namely they strongly opposed any deviation from the dual apprenticeship system in favor 
of policy options with greater state involvement. Thus, a purely employer-centered explanation, while 
theoretically plausible, does not hold empirically. 
A second line of argument looks at employer cleavages between economic sectors, rather than 
firm size, and brings trade unions into the picture as part of cross-class coalitions with employers in 
core manufacturing sectors. This line of argument has been mainly developed empirically with 
reference to the reforms that took place in 2004 and 2005 in Germany (cf. Busemeyer, 2012; Thelen, 
2014; Thelen & Busemeyer, 2012). By and large, the pattern of institutional change has been one of 
dualization through drift (Thelen, 2014, pp. 90-97), denoting the inability of the German political 
economy to reform its apprenticeship system in a way that maintains its social inclusion function. 
More specifically, recent accounts show that the lack of apprenticeship places has contributed to the 
expansion of the transition system, which accommodated the bulk of unsuccessful apprenticeship 
seekers. This development has been ascribed to a cross-class coalition between employers and 
insider-focused labor unions (Busemeyer, 2012; Thelen, 2014). In particular, the relative stability of 
a high-quality ‘core’ training system in manufacturing has been retained at the expense of a growing 
periphery characterized by lower quality and uncertain labor market value and particularly affecting 
the service sector. Neither employers nor trade unions had been willing to compromise on alternative 
paths towards full vocational qualifications for unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers and, as a 
consequence, a ‘dualized’ training system became institutionalized (Busemeyer, 2012, 2015; Thelen, 
2014; Thelen & Busemeyer, 2012). While the Austrian and German economies differ with respect to 
the distribution of firms by size (as noted earlier in this section), the aggregate sectoral composition 
of employment is essentially the same across the two countries,ii hence it might be hypothesized that 
the logic observed in Germany could equally play out in Austria. Yet, the association between a 
strong core system underpinned by a cross-class alliance in the manufacturing sector and an 
unregulated periphery of service sector is consistent with the German case, but it does not square well 
with the Austrian case. Here, as the case study will illustrate more extensively, the core was retained 
but, next to it, a high-quality inclusive system was established in 1998 and expanded in 2008 catering 
for those young people that do not land an apprenticeship place. The Austrian case therefore suggests 
that there is not a deterministic association between a strong core underpinned by a cross-class 
coalition and an unregulated periphery.  
A third potential explanation shifts the focus from employers onto unions and points to the 
crucial role of union centralization as a pre-condition for the development of inclusive policy 
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preferences across the labor movement (see for example Benassi & Vlandas, 2015; Durazzi, 2017; 
Durazzi, Fleckenstein, & Lee, 2018; Gordon, 2014; Oliver, 2010; Thelen, 2014, pp. 204-205). This 
approach mirrors to an extent the cross-class coalition argument summarized in the previous 
paragraph: in the presence of a fragmented union movement, for instance along industry lines, it 
might be conceivable that parts of the union movement prefer to enter into coalition with employers, 
rather than with the rest of the labor movement, if this is expected to bring gains for their core 
constituencies. On the contrary, if the labor movement is characterized by encompassing and 
centralized organizations, it might be expected that more inclusive policies are developed because in 
a centralized preference formation process, the weaker parts of the labor movement are more likely 
to be empowered (Gordon, 2014, p. 14). Differences between Austria and Germany in the 
centralization of the labor movement are stark: the Austrian trade union movement is the most 
centralized in the world with a score between 0.80-0.92 on a 0-1 summary index for centralization 
between 1998 and 2008. The German union movement on the contrary is fragmented along industry 
lines and accordingly it scored between 0.47-0.50 over the same period (Visser, 2015). In this respect, 
we should expect Austrian unions to take a more inclusive position than their German counterparts 
when it comes to vocational training policy. While the outcome that we observe is therefore consistent 
with the hypothesized set of preferences of the two union movements, empirical scrutiny of actors’ 
preferences only lends partial support to this hypothesis. As the case studies will discuss in further 
detail, the high degree of centralization in Austria helped the unions to achieve a common and 
inclusive position, consistently with the theoretical expectation. However, we find that the reverse 
does not hold true in the case of Germany. In other words, despite German unions being significantly 
fragmented along industry lines, all the major sectoral unions were against the establishment of any 
alternative paths towards full vocational qualifications for unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers. iii  
If it is not unions’ organizational structure determining the outcome of interest, a final 
alternative explanation might lie in unions’ power resources (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 
1983). As in the case of unions’ centralization, headline data makes this explanation attractive at the 
outset. Taking the coverage of collective bargaining as proxy for unions’ strength, we observe two 
starkly different pictures in Austria and Germany over the period of interest. In the former, coverage 
of collective bargaining over the last two decades has been constantly at very high levels, nearing 
100%. In the latter, it has been traditionally lower – and decreasing in the last decade from 67% to 
56% (Visser, 2015). Thus, it would be conceivable to hypothesize that strong Austrian unions 
imposed their first order preferences on employers, while relatively weaker German unions failed to 
do so. Yet, this proposition is consistent with the outcome, but less so with the underlying process. If 
unions’ sheer power vis-à-vis employers were to drive the outcome, we would observe different 
strategies, namely: Austrian unions would have been more likely than their German counterparts to 
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engage in a conflict against employers trying to force a training levy upon them, while German unions 
– aware of their relative weakness – would be expected to circumvent employers’ opposition. Yet, 
we observe the two union movements pursuing the exact opposite strategies, suggesting that a pure 
power resources explanation is not fully convincing. 
What, then, can explain the divergent trajectories of inclusion of the low skilled in the training 
systems? Simply put, we contend that unions are key to explain divergence between the most-similar 
systems of Austria and Germany but, differently from the union centralization and the pure power 
resources hypotheses, we argue that the institutional context within which unions operate is crucial 
in shaping their preferences (cf. Clegg & Van Wijnbergen, 2011). More specifically, we suggest that 
the literature has often overlooked the ‘size of the dual system’ as an important source of conflict 
between capital and labor in the politics of training. While we share the view widely held in the 
literature that employers and unions have often jointly defended the primacy of the dual system over 
other forms of training (Busemeyer, 2012; Thelen, 2014), preferences might diverge when it comes 
to its size. We expect that employers are chiefly concerned with avoiding skill shortages. Hence, they 
will be reluctant to offer apprenticeships that are not considered to be necessary for them and they 
will be therefore reluctant to give up control over how many training slots in the dual system should 
be offered. On the other hand, it is conceivable that unions, differently from employers, are more 
likely to push for the expansion of the dual system: they are aware that certified skills in the dual 
vocational training system are the most secure route to stable employment (Thelen, 2014, p. 96) and 
that workers with stable and standardized employment contracts are easier to mobilize than insecure 
workers in a stratified labor market (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 16). Hence shifting young people 
from lower quality forms of training to the dual system is expected to make unions gain power 
resources, through higher mobilization capacity, while enhancing the social inclusion function of the 
system by opening it up to young people that would not receive certified and / or high quality training 
otherwise.  
But how can unions’ preferences towards an expansion of highly skilled (future) workers be 
achieved? To answer this question, we introduce the role of the institutional context (namely: 
institutional resources and legacies) as crucial factor to understand the array of strategic choices that 
unions have at their disposal to countervail employers’ opposition to an expansion of the system. The 
key issue here is whether the institutional context allows for the formation of high quality, equally 
certified skills outside of the dual system. In particular, we identify two critical conditions that might 
turn unions in favor of pursuing skill formation outside of the dual system: firstly, unions must have 
a degree of control of training outside of the dual system comparable to the control they enjoy on the 
dual system (i.e. high institutional resources); and secondly, unions must have confidence that 
training outside the dual system delivers high quality skills (e.g. through positive institutional 
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legacies). Moreover, it should be noted that quality of training is in itself positively influenced by a 
high degree of unions’ control over training in line with the well-known argument of ‘beneficial 
constraints’ (Streeck, 1993, 1997). If these conditions hold, unions can side step employers’ 
opposition (e.g. by creating a system of parallel training outlets leading to the same certified skills). 
If this is not the case, unions can only enter into a confrontation with employers and (try to) force 
upon them an expansion of the system (e.g. through a training levy) – a strategy that might run counter 
employers’ threat to disinvest in training (cf. Busemeyer, 2012). This line of argument is developed 
empirically in the two case studies that follow. 
 
3. Austria’s wide road: trade unions between high institutional resources and positive legacies  
In response to an acute crisis of the apprenticeship market in 1998 that was expected to aggravate 
with the end of the school year, the social democratic-led grand coalition asked the social partners to 
elaborate a joint proposal by March 1998 (Gächter, 1998a, 1998b). The social partners entered the 
negotiations with widely opposing views on the integration of unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers 
into the training system. The unions, represented by the Chambers of Labor (AK) and Federal Trade 
Union Association (ÖGB), argued that all young people were to be provided with the opportunity to 
achieve a full training certification (AK, 1997). To this end, the unions proposed the establishment 
of non-firm-based training to reduce pressure on the apprenticeship market and to provide 
unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers with a viable training opportunity. Specifically, they proposed 
the creation of 4,000 training positions financed by the state for which curricula and certifications 
would be the same as in regular apprenticeships but the practical components would be delivered in 
training workshops or vocational schools instead of in firms (Gächter, 1998b).  
The employers, represented by the Chambers of Commerce (WKÖ), strongly opposed the 
proposal. They argued that the proposal would undermine the dual system and that de-coupling 
training from direct labor market needs would have made the country more vulnerable to high rates 
of youth unemployment. Moreover, they questioned increased state involvement in training policy 
on the grounds that it would decrease over time the practical relevance of training (WKÖ, 1997, 
1998a; 1998b, interview 9). The employers’ diagnosis was rather that some young people simply did 
not possess the necessary skills to successfully complete a regular apprenticeship (Gächter, 1998b; 
WKÖ, 1997). Therefore, the employers argued for the introduction of ‘part-apprenticeships’ for the 
low-skilled – a reduced form of regular apprenticeships in which more demanding elements of the 
curricula are left out (Gächter, 1998b; WKÖ, 1997). In addition, employers argued that the financial 
and regulatory burdens on businesses should be reduced to allow firms to hire more apprentices 
(Gächter, 1998b; WKÖ, 1998a). The final agreement, with respect to the issue of the low-skilled, 
followed very much the inclusionary position of the unions by creating a training ‘safety net’ which 
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was subsequently implemented by the government (BMAGS, BMWA, & BMUK, 1998). Crucial for 
the unions in achieving the establishment of the safety net was the idea that the measure would be 
limited in size and time: 4,000 publicly financed training positions were to be offered to the 1998 
cohort of secondary school leavers and training would take place in workshops under the management 
of the PES. Critically, to ensure that participants in the safety net would not be at disadvantage 
compared to participants in the training system, the unions insisted that the safety net would lead to 
the same certifications within the same timeframe as regular apprenticeships – i.e. that it provided 
equal qualifications (interview 7).  
In 1999, the social democrats lost the federal elections and between 2000 and 2007, two 
conservative governments took office. During this period, the unions successfully pursued the 
extension of the safety net with ad-hoc measures (Gächter, 1999) as it became clear that the crisis of 
the apprenticeship market was more structural than initially thought. Thus, in a total of six reforms 
the measure was repeatedly extended far beyond the initial 4,000 places. iv  However, while 
temporarily extending the measures, the government argued that a more structural response to the 
crisis of the dual system had to be based on market incentives. To this end, a set of fiscal incentives 
were made available to those firms that hired apprenticeships (Hoeckel & Schwartz, 2010). Yet, in 
2004 and 2005 youth unemployment reached a new peak in recent Austrian history of around 12%. 
Unions and SPÖ argued forcefully that the government was not doing enough and that the only 
effective and structural solution was to institutionalize a training guarantee (AK, 2006; SPÖ, 2006). 
This in practice would have meant turning the safety net into a structural policy measure, without 
limitations of time and size. The government rejected the proposal and continued to privilege the 
‘voluntarist approach’ based on tax incentives. But a new change in government in 2007 provided 
the political conditions for a training guarantee to be back on the agenda. In January 2007 the SPÖ 
took office again and, as in 1998, asked the social partners to submit a plan to tackle youth 
unemployment. The plan was submitted in October 2007 and proposed to turn the safety net into a 
permanent training guarantee through a system of supra-company state-financed training (ÜBA). The 
government took on board the social partners views and in 2008 presented the transformation of the 
temporary safety net into a permanent training guarantee as an ‘equally important and regular 
component of the dual system of vocational training’ (BAK, 2008, p. 34 emphasis added).  
The latest available data shows that non-firm based training has indeed become an important 
and regular element of the Austrian training regime: it has become, in other words, institutionalized. 
Data for the period 2010-2018v shows that the share of new apprentices entering non-firm based 
training has ranged from 10% to 13% of the total number of new apprentices (WKÖ, 2018). 
Furthermore, an evaluation of the ÜBA shows that students do equally well in their final exams – if 
not better – than regular apprentices (L&R Sozialforschung, 2015 , interview 7). The high quality of 
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ÜBA graduates is also corroborated by an employer survey which concludes that a majority of 
businesses does not see any difference from dual system graduates or even considers ÜBA graduates 
as more skilled (51% and 11% respectively), whilst only a minority of employers regards ÜBA 
graduates as less skilled than their peers from the dual system (38%) (L&R Sozialforschung, 2015). 
Most importantly, this system acts as a safety valve to guarantee access to equally certified training 
when companies do not offer enough apprenticeship positions. Precisely because of this feature, the 
ÜBA has been brought up in recent policy analyses as good practice compared to the German 
transition system that bridges the under-supply of apprenticeships with lower-quality training putting 
their participants at a significant labor market disadvantage (Lassnigg, 2017). 
The history of non-firm-based training, from temporary safety net to permanent training 
guarantee, clearly shows the crucial role of the unions. While the introduction of the training 
guarantee in 2008 shows that the ideological orientation of the governing party certainly mattered, in 
both 1998 and 2008 the unions were protagonists in developing the reform plans (interview 7), not 
least because the government openly delegated this task to the social partners (Bundesregierung 
Österreich, 1998, interview 10) and accepted their proposal without any significant revision 
(interview 10). Moreover – as the German case will make even clearer – considering the dominant 
role of social partners in dual training systems (see, e.g., Trampusch, 2010), it seems highly unlikely 
that any government could have introduced a non-firm based system against the joint opposition of 
unions and employers. As far as employers are concerned, even though the WKÖ has softened its 
tone towards the training guarantee in recent years (Sozialpartner, 2014), it should be remembered 
that employers openly opposed non-firm based training in both the 1998 and the 2008 reform and 
they would have not proposed a similar policy themselves (interview 9). Active support of the labor 
organizations for non-firm based training as a high-quality alternative for unsuccessful apprenticeship 
seekers was a necessary condition for the introduction of such a system in Austria. 
But why did the unions propose a safety net in the first place? When confronted with the 
apprenticeship crisis, the unions had a clear first-order preference: all young people who wanted to 
do an apprenticeship had to receive high-quality certified training in a way which would not prolong 
their transition from school to employment beyond the duration of a regular apprenticeship (interview 
7). This goal could be pursued through two policy routes. First, they could try to push through a 
training levy. Under a training levy, firms that do not hire apprentices are taxed, while firms that 
provide training receive financial assistance through the levy. Hence, more firms would be 
incentivized to train, which would increase the overall supply of firm-based apprenticeships. Second, 
they could try to establish an alternative system catering for those not landing an apprenticeship place. 
As discussed in the case study, the latter was pursued. The idea of a training levy was initially 
suggested by the ÖGB (Gächter, 1998a) but it was quickly dropped because it was regarded as 
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politically unfeasible (interview 7). The safety net therefore became the preferred policy option and 
the common goal that the unions worked towards.  
Two key factors shaped the unions’ preference formation process. Firstly, the unions did not 
have to develop the safety net ‘from scratch' but they could build on positive legacies. The Austrian 
law on vocational training contains a long-standing stipulation, dating back to the 1980s, for the 
establishment of ‘special independent training institutions’ (that is, the provision of apprenticeships 
outside of firms) and the availability of a sound pre-existing legal basis was important in bringing the 
unions to formulate this policy proposal (interview 7). In addition, such provisions already played a 
significant part in a national plan to tackle youth unemployment in the 1980s, when circa 20% of 
participants in anti-youth unemployment measures had been allocated to state-financed 
apprenticeships taking place in training institutions instead of in firms (Lassnigg, 1999, p. 10). 
Moreover, the unions, through their own training provider (the Berufsförderungsinstitut) and in 
cooperation with the PES, had experimented with training programs that closely resembled the safety 
net before advocating for it. Already in 1997, the unions launched two small-scale training initiativesvi 
that led unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers to a full vocational qualification through ‘high quality 
training’ carried out outside of firms (BFI, 1997). The unions held up these initiatives as evidence of 
their own commitment to helping young people accessing ‘fully-fledged apprenticeships’ and to put 
pressure on employers and policy-makers to follow suit (AK, 1997). Thus, in addition to the historical 
legacies from the 1980s, unions also resorted to more recent experiences, that provided them with in-
depth knowledge into the workings of non-firm based training and confidence that such experiments 
could be scaled up as high quality training programs across the country.   
Secondly, through their co-ownership of the PES as well as through youth boards within the 
training workshops, the unions exercise strong influence over the training conditions in the ÜBA 
(interviews 6, 7). The Austrian PES is a tripartite organization in which the social partners are 
involved in the implementation and control of labor market policies on the federal, state and regional 
levels. Indeed, the governance structure of the Austrian PES has been described as ‘social partnership 
“all the way down”’ (Weishaupt, 2011, p. 4). The PES delegates the execution of the ÜBA to 
independent service providers and the administrative board of the PES decides on guidelines and 
quality standards for the same. In addition, service providers are expected to ensure that trainees elect 
representatives who work in close contact with the youth secretaries of the unions (interview 6). This 
provides the unions with a high degree of insight into training in the ÜBA and with strong influence 
over the conditions on the shop floor (interview 6) to the point that union representatives stated that 
their influence over the training conditions within the ÜBA was equal, if not higher, to that in firm-
based training (interviews 6, 7): ‘with [training] providers, I can simply tell them what to do. Of 
course, I can do the same thing with a firm which is training, there are laws too, but firms are much 
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more difficult to sanction’ (interview 7). In other words, shifting training from the apprenticeship 
system to the safety net does not result in a loss of control over training for the unions.  
A further supportive factor for the positioning of the Austrian labor organizations lies in their 
high degree of centralization. The umbrella organization ÖGB and its sister organization AK have 
strong pre-eminence over the sectoral unions and it has been noted in section 2 how the Austrian trade 
union movement is the most centralized in the world according to Visser’s comparative dataset 
(Visser, 2015). Even though some union members initially met the idea of a non-firm-based 
alternative to the dual system with skepticism, high centralization helped the unions to internalize 
conflict about the safety net and take a common position. Indeed, there was a concern in parts of the 
unions that non-firm-based training would never fully emulate the reality of a workplace (interview 
7). In addition, there was some opposition to relieving firms of the financial obligation for training 
(interview 7). However, those disagreements were debated internally until a common position was 
found (interviews 6, 7) because, as one interviewee put it, ‘in Austria, we have the benefit of having 
a strong roof’ in the form of the umbrella union ÖGB (interview 6). Thus, despite some initial 
controversy, the Austrian unions managed to formulate a common and inclusive position thanks to 
their strong degree of centralization (interview 7). In sum, when the Austrian unions were faced with 
the crisis of the apprenticeship market, their institutional legacies and resources offered them a ‘wide 
road’ to social inclusion. Namely, they were in the position to consider two options, a training levy 
and a safety net / training guarantee, which were both viable in terms of delivering extra and high-
quality apprenticeship places without compromising on the unions’ control over the training system. 
The unions chose the most politically feasible option, which was adding a layer onto to the existing 
system through the safety net / training guarantee rather than trying to push through a training levy.  
Crucially, the introduction of the safety net as a separate layer attached to the existing training 
system and its subsequent institutionalization through the training guarantee is not only an instance 
of policy change, but it also triggered a more profound process of institutional change within the 
training system. Indeed, the training guarantee responds to a radically different institutional logic 
compared to the traditional apprenticeship system, namely a solidaristic logic enshrined in the right 
– underwritten by the state – to a training place for all. This stands in stark contrast with the logic 
governing access to the apprenticeship system, which responds essentially to market principles in 
which firms act as gatekeepers. Thus, through the institutionalization of the training guarantee, the 
Austrian skill formation system underwent a solidaristic transformation and avoided the exclusionary 
trajectory that coordinated skill formation systems are potentially faced with in the transition to a 




4. Germany’s narrow road: trade unions between low institutional resources and negative 
legacies  
In the early 2000s, Germany faced a crisis of the apprenticeship market similar to the one observed 
in Austria and, as in the previous case study, the lack of apprenticeships attracted increasing attention 
from policy-makers and social partners (Busemeyer, 2012). This development manifested itself in a 
decreasing supply of apprenticeship positions and a simultaneous increase in the size of the transition 
system (Ulrich & Eberhard, 2008). The latter refers to a patchwork of measures intended to prepare 
for an apprenticeship those young people who do not possess the necessary skills to start an 
apprenticeship upon completion of upper-secondary schooling. With declining regular apprenticeship 
positions, an increasing number of ‘apprenticeship-ready’ young people ended up in the transition 
system, which prolonged the length of their transition into employment without improving their skills 
(Beicht, 2009; Ulrich, 2008). 
To decrease pressure on the apprenticeship market, the German government proposed to 
temporarily upgrade the system of school-based vocational training (Lehmpfuhl & Müller-Tamke, 
2012, interview 5) which is generally regarded to be of lower quality than the dual system (Thelen, 
2014, p. 96). This proposal by the government suggests that at the level of party politics, the German 
context closely matched that of Austria: the SPD – as the Austrian SPÖ – showed a clear concern for 
the crisis of the apprenticeship market and its distributional consequences and by proposing the 
upgrading of the school-system showed its willingness to embark upon significant reforms to address 
the lack of apprenticeship places. A first draft on the main elements of the law made reference to the 
transition system by stating that it was unacceptable that young people would be forced into ‘waiting 
loops’ by economic downturns and that if employers could not supply a sufficient number of 
apprenticeship positions, there would need to be a reliable alternative (BMBF, 2004). To this end, the 
reform proposal suggested that graduates from school-based training could be allowed under certain 
conditions to sit the same exams as apprentices in the dual system and to receive the same 
certifications. Further, the Länder – which are in charge of education policy, including school-based 
vocational training – were to be given the opportunity to design new school-based training courses 
explicitly geared towards sitting dual apprenticeship exams (BMBF, 2004).  
These rules could have increased the number of training positions and potentially help low 
skilled youth (Busemeyer, 2012) but they would have also meant a leveling of school-based and firm-
based training (Lehmpfuhl & Müller-Tamke, 2012, interview 5). The proposal was opposed by unions 
and employers alike with the unsurprising exception of the teachers union which favored an 
expansion of school-based training (Busemeyer, 2012; DGB, 2003). In a striking parallel with the 
Austrian case, the unions argued that all young people should receive high quality certified training. 
However, differently from their Austrian counterparts, German unions translated their first-order 
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preference into a single non-negotiable policy option: the right to training of all young people was to 
be exclusively realized through the provision of additional firm-based apprenticeships (DGB, 2003). 
The position of employers was also along the lines of their Austrian counterparts. They were 
concerned that school-based training would increase the role of the state in the training system and 
eventually undermine firms’ control over the system (Busemeyer, 2012) and they demanded, as 
Austrian employers did, reforms to reduce regulatory burdens and lower the costs for employers in 
the training system (KWB, 2003a, 2003b). Despite unions’ and employers’ opposition, a temporarily 
upgrading of school-based system was formally enacted by law, but the decision on the specific 
school-based curricula that would permit students to sit the regular apprenticeship exams was left to 
tri-partite boards at state-level where the social partners had strong veto power (Busemeyer, 2012). 
As a consequence, school-based training under the newly created provision never took off 
substantially and even though the number of graduates from the school-based system taking exams 
in the dual system rose to 10,314 in 2009, this amounted to only 2% of all vocational training 
graduates (Lehmpfuhl & Müller-Tamke, 2012).  
Instead of upgrading school-based training, the confederal union DGB and most sectoral 
unions, including IG Metall and Ver.di,vii demanded the introduction of a training levy (DGB, 2004a; 
IGM & Ver.di, 2004a). The unions supported the training levy for two main reasons: first, they argued 
that a levy would improve the chances of young people in the apprenticeship market; secondly, they 
voiced their concern that any non-compulsory agreement on vocational training would allow 
employers to side step their duty towards the provision of training (Funk, 2004a). Employers, and 
with them the main opposition parties, fiercely opposed this policy proposal. In their view, the levy 
was ‘another bureaucratic hurdle in the path of firms and lead to further cost burdens on German 
companies’ (Funk, 2004a). Concerns whether an effective levy was technically feasible existed even 
within the SPD (Funk, 2004a). Against these concerns and because the Bundesrat was then under 
control of the opposition, the chances of the levy ever entering into force were very slim (interview 
5).viii In this context, a bill establishing a levy was passed by the Bundestag in June 2004 and 
forwarded to the Bundesrat. However, under strong pressure and with little chances of success in the 
Bundesrat, the government dropped the bill and instead entered into a voluntary pact ix with the 
employers (Busemeyer, 2012). Accordingly, employers promised to create 30,000 new 
apprenticeship positions in the following year. Yet, its nature was not binding, as made clear by the 
employers’ representative shortly after the pact was signed: ‘We cannot give any guarantees. The 
pact says that German business and employers will undertake every effort so that companies will 
create 30,000 new apprenticeships. […] On the other hand, because of economic difficulties, 
apprenticeships could be dropped’ (Funk, 2004b). 
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Precisely because of the non-committal nature of the pact, the unions did not sign it 
(interviews 1, 4). Thus, the unions did not manage to introduce a training levy, while, at the same 
time, they played a crucial role – by siding with employers – in blocking an increased use of school-
based training as an alternative to the dual system. Certainly, with the government supporting the 
upgrading of the school-based system, it would have been much more difficult for employers on their 
own to prevent such reform (as also suggested by the Austrian case). However, the unions decided to 
privilege the introduction of the training levy, a policy that was ultimately unsuccessful, and that was 
always considered as rather unlikely to succeed. While the voluntary pact may have helped 
ameliorating the situation, it did not manage to realign supply and demand in the apprenticeship 
market (Tageschau, 2006). As a consequence, significant shares of cohorts of school-leavers through 
the 2000s have been entering the transition system, which does not provide them with any 
certifications valued by the labor market and that often significantly extends the duration of their 
school-to-work transition (Beicht, 2009; Ulrich, 2008). Between 2005 and 2016, the share of young 
people entering the transition system fluctuated between 34% and 45% of the combined number of 
new entrants into the transition and dual systems (Destatis, 2017). In addition, about one fifth of youth 
in the transition system cannot find a regular apprenticeship even three years after having first entered 
the system (Beicht, 2009). Clearly, this scenario is not one that the unions ever wanted, given their 
demand for a right for quality vocational training for all young people (DGB, 2004b). Hence, why 
did the German unions oppose school-based training, which would at least have allowed youth to 
gain a professional qualification? And, given that the levy was highly unlikely to ever pass the 
Bundesrat, why did the unions pursue this policy as their chief strategy to counter the apprenticeship 
crisis? 
While the joint opposition of unions and employers to the upgrading of the school-based 
system conforms to an explanation based on cross-class coalitions, such an approach falls short of 
understanding why the unions strongly advocated a training levy – a position that denotes class 
conflict, rather than cross-class coalition. Drawing on the comparison with Austria, we provide an 
alternative explanation based on unions’ institutional resources and institutional legacies, which 
translated into expectations of low control over and low quality of training taking place outside the 
dual system. As discussed in the previous section, the Austrian labor unions exercise strong control 
over non-firm based training through their co-ownership of the PES. In Germany the situation was 
starkly different. The strong involvement of the social partners in the dual training system has long 
been acknowledged (see Streeck, Hilbert, van Kevelaer, Maier, & Weber, 1987 for an early account). 
Inside the dual system, the Federal Law on Vocational Training guarantees significant institutional 
involvement of the social partners and the consensus principle means that decisions concerning the 
content of training are hardly ever taken against the opposition of the unionsx (Streeck et al., 1987, 
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pp. 15-17). In addition, unions are involved in the supervision of the dual system through union 
officials at the workplace as well as through their membership on the advisory boards of the chambers 
of commerce (Streeck et al., 1987, pp. 34-35). However, the proposed upgrading of school-based 
training would have shifted parts of vocational training into the realm of education policy, which is a 
constitutional prerogative of the Länder (Pahl, 2007, pp. 151-167). Curricula in this field are 
developed by the Länder and coordinated by the Conference of Education Ministers (KMK) (Fritsche 
& Quante-Brandt, 2012). Furthermore, the supervision of vocational schools is carried out by 
respective departments of the Länder governments (Pahl, 2007, p. 158). This is not to say that the 
unions are without voice. For example, tripartite committees on vocational training are supposed to 
counsel the Länder governments on issues including school-based VET.xi However, while the unions 
enjoy strong de facto power in the dual system, their role is merely consultative in education policy. 
Consequently, representatives of German unions described their control over school-based training 
as little to none and certainly much more limited than their influence on training content and 
conditions in the dual system (interviews 2, 4), which stands in strong contrast to the perceived levels 
of control described by the Austrian union representatives.   
In addition, based on earlier experiences the German unions had low expectations about the 
quality of the measure and did not trust that it would provide young people with real opportunities. 
Union representatives mostly drew their opinion on the quality of school-based training from their 
experiences with the so-called ‘assistant professions’ (DGB, 2004b, interviews 1, 4). Training for 
assistant profession takes place entirely in vocational schools without any firm-based component. 
The unions were very critical of the assistant profession because, compared to regular apprentices, 
graduates from this type of training tend to be disadvantaged in the labor market (DGB, 2004b, 
interviews 1, 4). In their view, school-based training cannot stand up to the ‘real experience’ of work–
place training (IGM & Ver.di, 2004a, interviews 4, 8) and it has often produced graduates in 
professions that were not demanded by the labor market. As one interviewee explained ‘people were 
trained [in professions] for which teachers were available without there being a demand for the 
qualifications that were taught’ (interview 8). Such perception of German unions that school-based 
training is essentially a source of skills mismatch is a striking example of the different institutional 
legacies that the unions in the two countries were dealing with. Therefore, representatives of all 
unions – with the exception of the teachers union – rejected the idea of compensating the lack of 
regular apprenticeship positions through an increase in size of the school-based system.  
As anticipated in section 2, we do not find decentralization of decision-making within the 
union movement at sectoral level to have prevented the unions from formulating an alternative, more 
inclusive option. Indeed, teachers union aside, there was not any faction within the DGB supporting 
the government’s proposal to upgrade the school-based system (interview 8). Critically, we do not 
19 
 
find support for an upgrading of school-based training even when zooming into the position of the 
service sector union Ver.di (Kreft, 2006, p. 259), arguably the union that would have benefitted the 
most from such option given the over-representation of low-skilled workers in the service sector and 
their lower power resources compared to unions in core sectors, such as the metal-working union IG 
Metall (IGM). In response to the government’s proposed upgrading of school-based training, Ver.di 
published a joint position paper with IGM strongly criticizing the attempt to bridge the gap in 
apprenticeship places by increasing school-based training (IGM & Ver.di, 2004a, 2004b). In 
particular, Ver.di and IGM argued that the proposed reform was based upon two misguided goals. 
Firstly, they warned against the lower quality of training implied by the government proposal. If the 
goal of achieving ‘apprenticeships for all’ were to be achieved through equal certification between 
school-based training and apprenticeship training, this would mean that ‘practical training’ would not 
be a typical feature of German vocational training any longer and the labor market integration of 
school-based graduates unfamiliar with the realities of the workplace would become even more 
difficult (IGM & Ver.di, 2004b, p. 6). Secondly, they warned against the institutional implications of 
the reform, which was seen as leading to the ‘streamlining or even abolition of co-decision structures 
for the alleged goal of increasing efficiency’ (IGM & Ver.di, 2004b, p. 6).  
With the training levy failed and the upgrading of school-based actively opposed, the 
inclusion of low-skilled young people became dependent on the power resources that specific unions 
could exert at the local and/or sectoral level. This process was arguably most successful in the 
metalworking industry. IGM’s strength at the sectoral and firm levels allowed them to bargain for the 
expansion of apprenticeship places in many instances, including in Niedersachsen, Bremen and 
North-Rhine Westphalia as well as in their agreement with Volkswagen, for the years 2004, 2005 and 
2006 (WSI Tarifarchiv, 2018). In 2008, IGM in North-Rhine Westphalia further negotiated a sectoral 
agreement to help prepare disadvantaged youth for apprenticeships, effectively creating an alternative 
to the transition system for the metalworking sector. Yet, while other unions, most notably the union 
of chemical workers IG BCE and in a few instances even the service sector union Ver.di, managed 
to negotiate similar agreements,xii this does not apply to large parts of the Germany political economy, 
where the transition system remained the only option for low-skilled youth who could not find regular 
apprenticeships. However, the fact that several unions, albeit with different degrees of success, 
pursued the inclusion of young people through agreements at the sectoral level provides further 
support to the argument that it was neither the lack of centralization nor the lack of concern for the 
low-skilled that made German unions oppose the extension of school-based training. Rather, German 
unions came to oppose it because of the perceived ineffectiveness of training outside of the dual 
system and, once a national-level solution through the training levy failed, they worked towards 
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achieving the same results through the only available resources left to them, namely: sectoral and 
work-place agreements. 
In sum the institutional resources available to German unions were much narrower than those 
of their Austrian counterparts – and institutional legacies militated against any movement outside of 
the dual system. Because of the widely perceived inferiority of any option outside of the dual system 
and given the lack of control over training outside of the dual system, the unions’ only route towards 
greater inclusion of the low-skilled in the training system was to try to force a training levy upon 
employers, which proved politically unfeasible. As such, the lack of a wide set of institutional 
resources pushed German unions onto a politically-constrained terrain, which ultimately meant that 
employers had the upper-hand on the reforms of the training system, and unions achieved greater 




Since the late 1990s, politicians and social partners were confronted with the political problem of 
how to include in the training system those young people, mostly low-skilled, that are not able to land 
an apprenticeship place in the dual system. Against this background, we aimed to explain the 
divergent trajectories of institutional change in the Austrian and German training systems. A careful 
mapping of actors’ preferences showed that the position of governments and employers on how to 
tackle the crisis of the apprenticeship market matched closely across the two countries, while we 
found significant differences in unions’ behavior, making them the pivotal actor behind the different 
trajectories of institutional change that we observed. In Austria, the unions did not have ex-ante 
opposition to non-firm based training. This was determined by two factors: first, because of their 
strong role in the PES, unions had the legitimate expectation that they would play a strong role in the 
non-firm based system, hence the establishment of a non-firm based training system would not have 
decreased their overall power in the training system (high institutional resources); secondly, the 
positive experience with non-firm-based training strengthened unions’ confidence in the feasibility 
of delivering quality training in non-firm-based setting (positive institutional legacies). These two 
conditions, on the contrary, were largely missing in Germany where the unions had a clear non-
negotiable preference against any form of training that was not firm-based. Firstly, they feared that 
any movement outside of the dual system would have lowered their control on the training system; 
secondly, previous experiences with training outside of the dual system were by and large 
unsatisfactory, firmly grounding unions’ preferences within the dual system. In this respect, it is 
important to note the following point: unions’ (first-order) preferences were by and large the same in 
Austria and Germany. In both countries unions stood firmly in favor of expanding opportunities to 
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high-quality and inclusive training systems, which could therefore keep the economic efficiency and 
social inclusion aims of vocational training together. Yet, the institutional resources at their disposal 
determined a different translation of these preferences into policy proposals, which were met by 
opposite political fortunes. The availability of a wide road to social inclusion allowed Austrian unions 
to pursue a strategy of ‘layering’, which was largely successful, while the training levy advocated by 
the German unions failed. Our research therefore adds to the debate on institutional change in 
advanced capitalist countries, suggesting that – in a context of structural loss of power resources of 
trade unions vis-à-vis employers – institutional resources are critical to understand when and why 
unions’ preferences might still be on the ‘winning side’ of the policy process. Yet, with respect to 
existing contributions that highlight the importance of unions’ institutional resources (Davidsson & 
Emmenegger, 2013; Emmenegger, 2014), our case studies suggest that there is neither an inherent 
conflict nor a pre-determined trade-off between logic of influence and logic of membership. Rather, 
our analysis suggests that the two might be mutually reinforcing: by retaining influence over training 
outside the dual system, Austrian unions were able to secure what they thought of as the best outcome 
for their (prospective) members; conversely, German unions feared precisely that if training moved 
outside the dual system, i.e. in an institutional arena where they have low institutional resources and 
little control over training, that would have also led to an undesirable outcome for their (prospective) 
members, in the form of low-quality training. 
What are the broader lessons that can be learnt from our analysis? At times when governments 
across advanced capitalist countries seek policy solutions to simultaneously uphold economic 
competitiveness and social inclusion, our cases show that unions are important allies for the pursuit 
of these objectives. But we show that unions need to be empowered to have enough room for 
maneuver to provide an effective contribution towards these objectives. In particular, unions can 
pursue creative and politically feasible solutions when the institutional setting allows them to do so. 
If they are faced with significant trade-offs, they might be pushed onto a more defensive position, 
which might not be helpful in achieving those objectives. Governments – when promoting reforms – 
have the choice to empower or marginalize unions. Our cases show that empowering unions is 
desirable when pursuing socio-economic objectives that are broadly subsumed under the heading of 
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negotiated a sectoral agreement instead, and the construction workers union (IG BAU), which already 
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had a sectoral levy in place and feared that a general levy would undermine their model (Busemeyer, 
2012).  
viii Indeed, the levy would have needed the approval of the second chamber, the Bundesrat, in which 
the government had lost its majority already in 1999.  
ix Nationaler Pakt für Ausbildung und Fachkräftenachwuchs in Deutschland. 
x The unilateral introduction of 2-year apprenticeships by the minister of economy Wolfgang Clement 
was an important break with the tradition.  
xi § 82(1) Federal Law on Vocational Training. 
xii IG BCE negotiated the earlier mentioned agreement  “Zukunft durch Ausbildung” in 2003. Ver.di 
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